- uneducated in the field authors who defend a consensus they are being TOLD when they enter offices of Ed-Sci, teaching and writing works on learning-theory - but never checked the facts, PART I and PART II.

This paper explores how to deliberate about food choices from a Stoic perspective informed by the value of environmental sustainability. This perspective is reconstructed from both ancient and contemporary sources of Stoic philosophy. An account of what the Stoic goal of “living in agreement with Nature” would amount to in dietary practice is presented. Given ecological facts about food production, an argument is made that Stoic virtue made manifest as wisdom, justice, courage, and temperance compel Stoic practitioners to select locally (...) sourced, low resource input, plant-based foods whenever circumstances allow. (shrink)

Inferentialism is a theory in the philosophy of language which claims that the meanings of expressions are constituted by inferential roles or relations. Instead of a traditional model-theoretic semantics, it naturally lends itself to a proof-theoretic semantics, where meaning is understood in terms of inference rules with a proof system. Most work in proof-theoretic semantics has focused on logical constants, with comparatively little work on the semantics of non-logical vocabulary. Drawing on Robert Brandom’s notion of material inference and Greg Restall’s (...) bilateralist interpretation of the multiple conclusion sequent calculus, I present a proof-theoretic semantics for atomic sentences and their constituent names and predicates. The resulting system has several interesting features: (1) the rules are harmonious and stable; (2) the rules create a structure analogous to familiar model-theoretic semantics; and (3) the semantics is compositional, in that the rules for atomic sentences are determined by those for their constituent names and predicates. (shrink)

In this paper, we discuss three probabilistic arguments for the existence of multiple universes. First, we provide an analysis of total evidence and use that analysis to defend Roger White's "this universe" objection to a standard fine-tuning argument for multiple universes. Second, we explain why Rodney Holder's recent cosmological argument for multiple universes is unconvincing. Third, we develop a "Cartesian argument" for multiple universes. While this argument is not open to the objections previously noted, we show that, given certain highly (...) plausible assumptions about evidence and epistemic probability, the proposition which it treats as evidence cannot coherently be regarded as evidence for anything. This raises the question of whether to reject the assumptions or accept that such a proposition cannot be evidence. (shrink)

Debates on humanitarian intervention have focused on the permissibility question. In this paper, I ask whether intervention can be a moral duty, and if it is a moral duty, how this duty is to be distributed and assigned. With respect to the first question, I contemplate whether an intervention that has met the "permissibility" condition is also for this reason necessary and obligatory. If so, the gap between permission and obligation closes in the case of humanitarian intervention. On the second (...) question, I propose 'institutionalizing" the duty to intervene. In this way, an otherwise imperfect obligation to intervene can be made "perfect" and specific to some agent. (shrink)

This chapter examines two basic philosophical challenges for the idea of reparations for past injustices (using colonialism as the focal point). The first challenge is that requiring people today to make reparations for an injustice they themselves did not commit is unfair. The second is that if reparative claims are invoked because of lingering injustices, then recalling the past is in fact normatively redundant if lingering present injustices can be handled by forward-looking principles. In response to the first challenge, I (...) argue that the unfairness worry is deflected if we adopt a collectivist-model of responsibility, ie, one that holds states instead of individuals to be the responsible actor. Against the redundancy objection, I suggest that reparative arguments can supplement and reinforce forward-looking distributive principles. (shrink)

Luck egalitarianism provides one powerful way of defending global egalitarianism. The basic luck egalitarian idea that persons ought not to be disadvantaged compared to others on account of his or her bad luck seems to extend naturally to the global arena, where random factors such as persons’ place of birth and the natural distribution of the world’s resources do affect differentially their life chances. Yet luck egalitarianism as an ideal, as well as its global application, has come under severe criticisms (...) in recent debate. My aim in this article is to restore plausibility to the luck egalitarian idea, and to suggest how it could then provide a plausible grounding for global egalitarianism. To do this, I will propose a more modest but also more defensible conception of luck egalitarianism that can also strengthen the case for global distributive justice. (shrink)

Kant divides moral duties into duties of virtue and duties of justice. Duties of virtue are imperfect duties, the fulfillment of which is left to agent discretion and so cannot be externally demanded of one. Duties of justice, while perfect, seem to be restricted to negative duties (of nondeception and noncoercion). It may seem then that Kant's moral philosophy cannot meet the demands of global justice. I argue, however, that Kantian justice when applied to the social and historical realities of (...) the world can generate positive duties to promote and provide for the well being of others. (shrink)

Inferentialists about scientific representation hold that an apparatus’s representing a target system consists in the apparatus allowing “surrogative inferences” about the target. I argue that a serious problem for inferentialism arises from the fact that many scientific theories and models contain internal inconsistencies. Inferentialism, left unamended, implies that inconsistent scientific models have unlimited representational power, since an inconsistency permits any conclusion to be inferred. I consider a number of ways that inferentialists can respond to this challenge before suggesting my own (...) solution. I develop an analogy to exploitable glitches in a game. Even though inconsistent representational apparatuses may in some sense allow for contradictions to be generated within them, doing so violates the intended function of the apparatus’s parts and hence violates representational “gameplay.”. (shrink)

This paper provides a proof-theoretic account of imperative logical consequence by generalising Greg Restall’s multiple conclusion bilateralism for declarative logic. According to imperative bilateralism, a sequent Γ ⊢ Δ is valid iff jointly commanding all the imperatives Φ ∈ Γ and prohibiting all the imperatives Ψ ∈ Δ clashes. This account has three main virtues: (1) it provides a proof-theoretic account of imperatives; (2) it does not rely on the controversial notion of imperative inference; and (3) it is neutral regarding (...) cognitivism about imperatives. (shrink)

It is a received view of the post-Fregean predicate logic that a universal statement has no existential import and thus does not entail its particular (existential) counterpart. This paper takes issue with the view by discussing the trespasser case, which has widely been employed for supporting the view. The trespasser case in fact involves a shift of context. Properly understood, the case provides no support for the received view but rather suggests that we rethink the ‘quantity view’ of the existential (...) import of quantifiers. (shrink)

I outline what I call a relational account of toleration. This relational account helps explain the apparent paradox of toleration in that it involves two competing moral stances, of acceptance and disapproval, towards the tolerated. It also helps clarify the way toleration is a normative ideal, and not a position one is forced into out of the practical need to accommodate or accept. Specifically, toleration is recommended out of respect for that which the tolerant agent also disapproves of. This combination (...) of respect entangled with disapproval results from two different evaluative perspectives of the tolerant agent. The relational account explains how an agent can hold these competing evaluative perspectives. I also discuss the proper scope of state toleration under this relational account. (shrink)

The gig economy is a phenomenon that is rapidly expanding, redefining the nature of work and contributing to a significant change in how contemporary economies are organised. Its expansion is not unproblematic. This article provides a clear and systematic analysis of the main ethical challenges caused by the gig economy. Following a brief overview of the gig economy, its scope and scale, we map the key ethical problems that it gives rise to, as they are discussed in the relevant literature. (...) We map them onto three categories: the new organisation of work (what is done), the new nature of work (how it is done), and the new status of workers (who does it). We then evaluate a recent initiative from the EU that seeks to address the challenges of the gig economy. The 2019 report of the European High-Level Expert Group on the Impact of the Digital Transformation on EU Labour Markets is a positive step in the right direction. However, we argue that ethical concerns relating to algorithmic systems as mechanisms of control, and the discrimination, exclusion and disconnectedness faced by gig workers require further deliberation and policy response. A brief conclusion completes the analysis. The appendix presents the methodology underpinning our literature review. (shrink)

In the face of conflict, power can be defined as ‘the ability to get one’s needs met [1].’ Power requires not just an ability to do or act by strength and force, but also requires an inherent want and need for a commodity. Yet it is self-explanatory that a desire for power isn’t temporary, but perpetual, with those whose needs are satisfied always yearning for more. This can lead to longer term conflict, suggesting the gradient of power enrooted within society, (...) is the sole perpetrator towards worldwide violence; yet is it possible to completely eradicate violence from society, when individuals, parties and states will never stop their crave for greater power? (shrink)

How should liberal societies respond to nonliberal ones? In this paper I examine John Rawls’s conception of international toleration against what is sometimes called a cosmopolitan one. Rawls holds that a just international order should recognize certain nonliberal societies, to which he refers as decent peoples, as equal members in good standing in a just society of peoples. It would be a violation of liberalism’s own principle of toleration to deny the international legitimacy of decent peoples who, among other things, (...) affirm human rights and accept peaceful coexistence with other societies. According to the cosmopolitan idea of international toleration, on the contrary, only societies that are liberal in character meet the criteria for toleration. I suggest that, against the Rawlsian conception of international toleration, the cosmopolitan idea is more consistent with the fundamentals of liberal political morality. I then clarify the ways in which cosmopolitan toleration is not worryingly interventionist even as it is not altogether toothless; and I end with some reflections on why cosmopolitism is not morally imperialistic. (shrink)

Sometimes, scientific models are either intended to or plausibly interpreted as representing nonactual but possible targets. Call this “hypothetical modeling”. This paper raises two epistemological challenges concerning hypothetical modeling. To begin with, I observe that given common philosophical assumptions about the scope of objective possibility, hypothetical models are fallible with respect to what is objectively possible. There is thus a need to distinguish between accurate and inaccurate hypothetical modeling. The first epistemological challenge is that no account of the epistemology of (...) hypothetical models seems to cohere with the most characteristic function of scientific modeling in general, i.e., surrogative representation. The second epistemological challenge is a version of “reliability challenges” familiar from other areas. There is a challenge to explain how hypothetical models could be a reliable guide to what is possible, given that they are not and cannot be compared against their nonactual targets and updated accordingly. I close with some brief remarks on possible solutions to these challenges. (shrink)

Democratic decision-making is often defended on grounds of the ‘wisdom of crowds’: decisions are more likely to be correct if they are based on many independent opinions, so a typical argument in social epistemology. But what does it mean to have independent opinions? Opinions can be probabilistically dependent even if individuals form their opinion in causal isolation from each other. We distinguish four probabilistic notions of opinion independence. Which of them holds depends on how individuals are causally affected by environmental (...) factors such as commonly perceived evidence. In a general theorem, we identify causal conditions guaranteeing each kind of opinion independence. These results have implications for whether and how ‘wisdom of crowds’ arguments are possible, and how truth-conducive institutions can be designed. (shrink)

This article argues that the contemporary acceptability of abortion is not solely due to the Liberal imperative to exercise individual choice. Rather, abortion's acceptability needs to be explained with reference to the techniques of consumer culture. This article will begin by explaining how practices in general predispose one to gravitate towards one form of practices rather than another. It will then look at how consumer practices generate a biopolitics of economic efficiency and corporeal commodification which culminates in a politics of (...) visibility. Under such conditions, even basic categories like mere existence is dependent on its ability to be displayed for public view. This article will conclude by reflecting on the necessity of forging the Church not as a subsection of a public framed by consumerism, but as an alternative public in its own right. (shrink)

Two classes of arguments are often deployed by the anti-global egalitarians against attempts to universalize the demands of distributive equality. One are arguments attempting to show that global egalitarians have misconstrued the reasons for why equality matters domestically, and hence have wrongly extended these reasons to the global arena. These arguments hold that the boundary of distributive justice is effectively coextensive with the boundaries of state. The other are arguments that attempt to show that membership in political societies generates special (...) duties among members that may outweigh the demands of global egalitarianism. These arguments appeal to the ethical significance of state boundaries and membership. In my defense of global egalitarianism, I reject both the attempts to limit the boundary of justice and the attempts to give state boundaries special moral significance and priority. In particular, I will argue that the boundary of justice cannot coincide with the boundaries of states when the justice of the boundaries is at issue. (shrink)

Political science is divided between methodological individualists, who seek to explain political phenomena by reference to individuals and their interactions, and holists (or nonreductionists), who consider some higher-level social entities or properties such as states, institutions, or cultures ontologically or causally significant. We propose a reconciliation between these two perspectives, building on related work in philosophy. After laying out a taxonomy of different variants of each view, we observe that (i) although political phenomena result from underlying individual attitudes and behavior, (...) individual-level descriptions do not always capture all explanatorily salient properties, and (ii) nonreductionistic explanations are mandated when social regularities are robust to changes in their individual-level realization. We characterize the dividing line between phenomena requiring nonreductionistic explanation and phenomena permitting individualistic explanation and give examples from the study of ethnic conflicts, social-network theory, and international-relations theory. (shrink)

The criticism of the theist arguments for the existence of God by philosophers like Spinoza, Hume and Kant has led religious thinkers to new searches. One of these is the argument of religious experience. Religious experience is classified according to its ways of occurrence. It needs be criticised whether mystic experience, which is included under this classification, should be taken as ‘religious’ or not. This is because many claims of mystic thought, which can be found in any religious tradition in (...) different disguises, do not comply with theistic religions’ understanding of religion, morals and God. Whereas the mystic thought argues for union with the God, this is out of question in the theistic understanding of religion. The duality, that is; the separateness of God and man, that they cannot unite, the impossibility of man to become a God are oft-repeated in the sacred texts and the oneness of God is the main theme being taught to mankind. For this reason, the teachings of mystic thought should not be included in ‘religious experience’. (shrink)

This paper compares criticisms of Singapore’s meritocracy, especially against its impact on income disparities and class divisions, with Michael Sandel’s critique of the meritocratic ethic in the United States. Despite significant differences in their history and politics, meritocracy has similar dysfunctions in both societies, allowing us to draw theoretical conclusions about meritocracy as an ideal of governance. It then contrasts Sandel’s communitarian critique of meritocracy with recent Confucian promotion of political meritocracy and meritocratic justice and argues that the Confucian principle (...) of “promoting the virtuous and talented” is different from the contemporary conception of meritocracy. Textual evidence indicates that a Confucian understanding of “merit” is contrary to the technocratic expertise of contemporary meritocracies. Furthermore, pre-Qin Confucian texts do not support a conception of justice that emphasizes individual desert; they address distributive problems from the perspective of needs and sustaining social relations. The texts also support limiting the reign of merit when it results in inequalities that cause suffering, inhibit personal cultivation of some groups, or undermine social relations. The paper concludes with an assessment of Singapore’s on-going attempts to improve its meritocracy from a Confucian perspective. (shrink)

After Parmenides proposed the duality of appearance and reality, details have not been well developed because the assumption was insufficient for logical reasoning. This paper establishes a foundation with an isolated system, which contains all causes and effects within itself. This paper seeks to establish a purely logical philosophy, including reality and phenomena, good and evil, truth and fallacy. Freedom is proposed as the basis for reality. All beings in an isolated system can be classified into two sets: variable phenomena (...) and constant realities. Realities are the only reasons for phenomena, and phenomena are the only results of realities. The sum of certain realities constitutes a reality, and the sum of all realities is good. Good creates most of the phenomenal world. A reality is universalizable; a phenomenon is never universalizable. Good is the only reality which is close to universality and keeps on universalizing. Truth is the simplest knowledge about universal or approximately universal beings. The universality of a reality measures the percentage of phenomena accompanied by this reality. There are two levels of truth: truth about all realities, and truth about the good. (shrink)

The contemporary theory of epistemic democracy often draws on the Condorcet Jury Theorem to formally justify the ‘wisdom of crowds’. But this theorem is inapplicable in its current form, since one of its premises – voter independence – is notoriously violated. This premise carries responsibility for the theorem's misleading conclusion that ‘large crowds are infallible’. We prove a more useful jury theorem: under defensible premises, ‘large crowds are fallible but better than small groups’. This theorem rehabilitates the importance of deliberation (...) and education, which appear inessential in the classical jury framework. Our theorem is related to Ladha's (1993) seminal jury theorem for interchangeable (‘indistinguishable’) voters based on de Finetti's Theorem. We also prove a more general and simpler such jury theorem. (shrink)

This paper adopts the philosophical approach of Stoicism as the basis for re-examining the cognitive and ethical relationship between Homo sapiens and Neanderthals. Stoicism sets out a clear criterion for the special moral status of human beings, namely rationality. We explore to what extent Neanderthals were sufficiently rational to be considered “human”. Recent findings in the fields of palaeoanthropology and palaeogenetics show that Neanderthals possessed high-level cognitive abilities and produced viable offspring with anatomically modern humans. Our discussion offers insights for (...) reflecting on the relationship between humans and other forms of natural life and any moral obligations that result. (shrink)

Đầu tư vào rừng đô thị không chỉ là một chiến lược môi trường, mà còn là đầu tư cho sức khỏe cộng đồng và phúc lợi kinh tế.

The issue of emotion is discussed in three stages in this article. Thus, emotion is built on a realistic and explanatory basis. In the first stage, the relationship between the physiological structure of the human brain and emotion is emphasized. The connection between the lower/primitive brain (the region/emotion center where emotions arise) and the upper/developed brain (mind-logic center, prefrontal lobe) is mentioned. Secondly, the emotional and mental development of human according to Jean Piaget's Mental Development Theory is explained. In the (...) emotional / intuitive period of 4-7 years (Emotional Intuition), while the person is completely under the influence of emotions, at the age of 7-11, he becomes aware of a concrete world accompanying emotions and passes to the Concrete Operations Period. It experiences the universe by "experiment" in the concrete operational period. And at the age of 11-17, the human reaches the Abstract Operations Period with the addition of reason and logic to his mental structure, which he built by putting a concrete universe on the core of emotions. Emotion is one of the most important functions of the human brain, and the reasoning system has evolved as an extension of the emotional system. Emotion plays different roles in the reasoning process. Emotion can increase the weight of a proposition, affecting the result in favor of that proposition. Emotion also helps in the process of remembering the many facts that need to be taken into account in order to make a decision. It has been explained through examples that emotion has a very important function in reasoning and that the mind is also important in controlling emotions. Again, emotion can help the mind / logic process scientific knowledge correctly and make good decisions. (shrink)

The theme of this study is about establishing a purely logical theory about the Universe. Logic is the premier candidate for the reality behind phenomena. If there is a final theory, the Universe must be logic itself, called pure logic, elements of which include not only logic and illogic but also logical and illogical manipulations between them. The kernel is the revised law of the excluded middle: between two basic concepts are four possible manipulations, three logical and one illogical, whereas (...) only one is realized. The key parameter for an element is aim, including reason, outcome, and neutrality. When an element is a contradiction, it can be located at three positions: reason, outcome, and manipulation, corresponding to three colors of quark. Thus, there is interaction with the SU(3) symmetry keeping the number of the three elements balanced locally. A proposition without contradiction has two independent aims. When one aim changes, there is interaction with the U(1) symmetry. When two aims change together, there is interaction with the SU(2) symmetry. (shrink)

Dinî tecrübe Friedrich Schleiermacher (ö.1768) ile önem kazanan ve William James’in (ö.1842) eserleriyle din felsefesinde teistik delillerin içine dahil olan bir delildir. Dini tecrübelerin birçok şekilde meydana geldiği iddia edilmektedir. Bunlardan biri de sezgidir. Bu bildirinin amacı sezgisel bilginin Tanrı’nın varlığına delil olup olmadığını ortaya koymaktır. Sezgisel yetenek, insanın fiziksel gelişimine (yani beyin) paralel olarak gelişen bir yetidir ve zihnin gelişmesiyle birlikte kapasitesi artmaktadır. Önce çocukta duygusal bir sezgi hakim iken (4-7 yaş), daha sonra çocuğun somut işlemlere geçmesiyle sezgisel yetenek (...) somutla ilişkili hale gelir. (7-11 yaş) Ve somut nesne ve durumlar (deney ve pratikler) çocuğun sezgisel yeteneğinin gelişmesine yol açar. En son aşamada yani soyut işlemler döneminde (11-17 yaş) çocuğun beyninde prefrontal lobun gelişmesine bağlı olarak akli muhakeme gelişir ve bunun etkisiyle sezgisel yetenek, akli verileri kullanarak soyut sezgiye yönelir. Sezgisel yetenek böylece üç dönemin özelliklerini gösterebilir; çocukluktan aldığı duygusal sezgi ve somut/nesnenin çağrıştırdığı somut sezgi ve aklın dış dünyadan aldığı bilgileri zihinsel süreçlerden geçirerek işlemesi sonucu gelişen akılcı sezgi. O nedenle insanlarda tek bir sezgiden bahsetmek yanlıştır. Sezginin üç türü birbiriyle eş güdümlü olarak bilgiyi elde etmek için çalışır. Bu üç sezgi türünden akılcı sezgiye önem veren İbn Sina, sezgi bilgisini rasyonel, epistemolojik alana dahil eder. Yaptığı ilim sınıflamasında sezgi bilgisini deneye dayalı bilgi türü olarak görür ve akla/deneye dayalı bir sezgi anlayışı geliştirir. Bu sezgi anlayışı, peygamberliği rasyonel bir temele oturtmak ve irrasyonel olmadığın açıklamak için de kullanır. Kudsi akla sahip peygamberler üstün zekalarının etkisiyle güçlü sezgiye sahip olurlar ve vahiy alırlar. Vahiy alan sezgisel yetenek diğer insanlarda ortaya çıkıp dini tecrübeleri şekillendirebilir mi? Peygamberlerin vahiy tecrübesini taklit ederek kendilerinde yüksek sezgisel yeti olduğunu savunan bazı kişiler (veli) ilham yoluyla bilgi elde ettiklerini iddia etmişlerdir. Dini tecrübe delilinde bu tür tecrübeler dini delil olarak sayılmaktadır. Fakat bu sezgisel bilginin kaynağı duygu mudur, somut bir gösterge (deney) midir yoksa akıl mıdır? İlham ürünü olan eserlerde her zaman duygu vardır ve bu tür ifadeler insanı duygunun hakim olduğu zihinsel bir duruma götürür. Fakat vahiy tecrübesinde duygunun yanında, somut dünyanın varlığı ve akla dayalı bir sezginin olduğu da vurgulanmaktadır. O nedenle sezgisel bilgi ürünü vahiy üç tür sezgi bilgisine dayalı iken, ilham ürünü olan sezgisel bilgi sadece duyguya dayalıdır. O nedenle ‘dini’ bir delil olarak değil ‘mistik’ bir delil olarak değerlendirmeyi hak eder. (shrink)